Paper Summary:

This paper explores the operational effectiveness of the Allied campaign in Norway in 1940. In presenting the essential issues which affected the operational effectiveness of the Allied campaign, consistent focus is given to why the campaign itself ultimately failed. However, fully explicating the operational failures which occurred can only be achieved when wider issues are addressed. As such, this paper details the theoretical assumptions which directed Allied policy in Norway in a way which highlights ineffectual leadership and indecision. On this basis, the paper then details the operational failures which occurred in Norway as a result of incoherence between the service arms involved in the campaign. Finally, through reference to the assessments undertaken in relation to the Norwegian campaign, a number of enduring lessons are proffered in relation to the contemporary environment.

Outline:
Abstract
Introduction
Methodology
Chapter One: Strategic Errors in Allied Planning and the Role of Winston Churchill
Chapter Two: Requirements and Difficulties for Effective Joint Operations
Chapter Three: Accounting for the Norwegian Failure: The Conduct of the Joint Campaign in Reference to the Three Services
Operational Lessons for the Modern Environment
Conclusion

From the Paper:

"The battle for Norway, fought between Germany and the Allies represents one of the early pivotal confrontations of the Second World War. In many respects, the German victory in Norway laid an effective basis on which the Germans were to develop military strategy in the later years of the war. Thus, the occupation and utilisation of Norwegian air bases and sea ports proved essential to German campaigns undertaken in wider battles, most notably in the Atlantic. Given this, the Norwegian campaign which lasted from April to June 1940 acts as a key point of academic investigation in the Second World War. Moreover, the nature and characteristics of the battle for Norway has direct and unequivocal connotations for military and operational strategy. In particular, both the Allies and Germany engaged in Norway using a military approach which was personified by the need for a joint campaign, utilising various different sectors of the respective militaries. Although the use of air power was integral to the battle for Norway and will be addressed, the confrontation was essentially founded on an operational combination of sea power and land attack. Therefore, at the operational level, it is here that detailed investigation must be undertaken."

Sample of Sources Used:

• Andenaes, Johannes. Norway and the Second World War. London: Tanum, 1966.
• Baxley, Brian. Operation Weseruebung: the dawn of decisive airpower in joint military operations. London: Nimble, 2010.
• Brown, David (ed) Naval operations of the campaign in Norway, April-June 1940. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
• Buckley, Christopher. Norway the commandos Dieppe. London: HMSO, 1951.
• Colville, John. The Fringes of Power: Downing Street diaries, 1939-1955. London: Widenfeld & Nicolson, 2004.

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