This paper analyzes the internal and external influences of the FLN on Algeria's history during the late twentieth century, focusing on political and economical factors and the key questions of Islam and 'democracy'.
This paper explains that the FLN metamorphosed from a military force to a constructed symbolical emblem of the state and the process of nation-building, emblematic of the wider structural characteristics of Algerian 'nation-building'. The author points out that FLN's 'rise' can be characterized as a product of the extreme tactics of the French, which drove even the formerly moderate members of the MTLD into the arms of the FLN; and this brutality of French methods gave encouragement to the radical wing within the FLN. The paper relates that the 'fall' of the FLN represented a continuation of the tendency to use it as a smokescreen to hide the rivalries and machinations of political leaders, a result of structural problems within the heart of the Algerian regime, not a clash of absolutes between a popular Islam and a secular state, which caused the upheaval.
From the Paper:
"Not being able to determine the direction of French politics, the FLN was least of all able to rectify its own weaknesses and divisions. Ruedy shows that the FLN had a surprisingly narrow basis of popular support. The growing determination of radical elements within the FLN, and the intensification of the conflict overall, meant that independence was only attained after much civil strife as well. The FLN punished Algerians who compromised with the French, even those who simply paid taxes. The tactics of the internal leadership after the Soummam Congress also served to distance them from the plight of the peasants within the agricultural interior."